There is criticism directed towards Ukraine for their prolonged efforts in winning the conflict, while others question if they can win at all. The situation seems to be at a standstill, resembling the attrition-based warfare of World War I, with heavy artillery but limited maneuverability. Given that many Ukrainians have received training from NATO allies, why is the progress so slow?
One possible explanation is the lack of equipment for maneuverability provided to Ukraine. While NATO has supplied Ukraine with the means to shoot, the shortage of ammunition continues to be a problem. Expenditure rates indicate the increasing need for shells and rockets. Communication capabilities have been improved through Starlink. However, what is lacking is a sufficient quantity of protected mobility, also known as combined arms maneuver.
The U.S. Army possesses armored divisions consisting of three to four maneuver brigades with tanks and infantry fighting vehicles, an artillery brigade, a logistics support brigade, and additional enablers like engineers, signal, and air defense units. Providing Ukraine with this level of equipment would require several years, a luxury that Ukrainians cannot afford as it comes at the cost of their soldiers and civilians. Even if Congress approves the requested funding from the president, there are still challenges with the industrial base that would mean delayed delivery. The solution, therefore, is to transfer existing equipment from the U.S. Army to Ukraine, while the Army acquires new equipment over the next few years.
In more specific terms, the Army should transfer a division’s worth of equipment to Ukraine. This not only helps Ukraine break through Russian defenses but also contributes to modernizing the U.S. Army, strengthening industrial capabilities, and increasing readiness by ensuring units are fully manned.
The division’s worth of equipment is not an arbitrary number. It is directly tied to the current size of the Army, which is struggling due to one of the worst recruiting crises it has faced. The shortage of soldiers is significant enough to necessitate a reduction in the structure of special operations forces. Moreover, the Army’s active duty strength has decreased by 7% over the past few years, dropping from approximately 485,000 personnel in fiscal year 2020 to around 452,000 today.
Transferring this equipment would contribute to the Army’s modernization efforts as many of its weapons are outdated and need to be replaced with more advanced versions of tanks like the Abrams, the Bradley fighting vehicle, and the new Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle. Given the budget constraints on the Army, achieving this modernization independently would be difficult. By transferring equipment to Ukraine, the Army would receive newer weapons in return.
Additionally, transferring this equipment would enhance industrial capabilities. Ukraine has demonstrated the importance of being able to rearm during war. Sending these weapons, along with other aid packages, has compelled the Army to increase its production capacity rapidly.
For example, the production of 155mm artillery shells has surged from 14,000 shells per month to 28,000 per month in the past year alone, with plans to increase it further to 57,000 shells per month and ultimately to 100,000 shells per month by 2025. Transferring more equipment to Ukraine would reinforce the importance of expanding production for other necessary equipment.
Finally, the Army must streamline its units to avoid becoming hollow, a term coined in the late 1970s to describe an army that exists only in name. Having excessive structure and insufficient soldiers leads to a hollow army. Therefore, divesting a division’s worth of equipment would enhance the readiness of the Army. If recruiting improves in the future, replacement equipment can be obtained.
In summary, it is in the best interest of the Army’s future and the success of the Ukrainian counteroffensive to transfer a division’s worth of weapons and equipment to Ukraine. This would be a small sacrifice to help Ukraine defeat one of our top adversaries and modernize the Army.
Retired U.S. Army Maj. Gen. John Ferrari is a senior nonresident fellow at the American Enterprise Institute think tank. Ferrari previously served as a director of program analysis and evaluation for the Army.
