It is a rarity for an ambassador to bring attention to a flaw in a foreign policy initiative to a host government. French Ambassador Michèle Boccoz did just that in the West Philippine Sea (WPS) dispute when she questioned the Philippines’ expectations in raising the issue to the United Nations (UN). Boccoz’s statement can be seen as a friendly advice, as it provides an opportunity to discuss the flaws in the proposed resolution. These flaws include the dubious nature of the resolution, the misleading statements about submitting the issue to the UN General Assembly (UNGA), and the lack of a clear plan if the resolution is approved by the UNGA.
In the realm of multilateral diplomacy, resolutions are crafted with the question, “What benefits do I get?” in mind. Nations, much like individuals, act out of self-interest. To address this self-interest, a resolution should focus on requesting the UNGA to grant full access to the resources in the areas allocated to the Philippines under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). China’s denial of access to these resources in the WPS is a clear violation of our rights. Such a resolution would not only benefit the Philippines but also all littoral member states of the UN. As a result, it should receive widespread support from the majority of the 145 littoral states.
The current wording of the proposed Senate resolution would only secure three guaranteed votes. It fails to cater to the self-interest of most nations, as it directly addresses the harassment faced by Vietnam and the Philippines, with occasional instances involving Malaysia. A resolution focused on broader benefits and access to resources would have a higher chance of gaining support.
Retired Supreme Court Senior Associate Justice Antonio Carpio’s suggestion that our resolution should be presented to the UNGA is misleading. The ongoing events in the WPS are considered “threats to peace” and should be presented to the UN Security Council (UNSC). The UNGA can only accept such a complaint if the UNSC is incapable of taking action due to a veto by one of its permanent members. This can be done through the “Uniting for Peace” resolution. The UNSC consists of five permanent members (Britain, China, France, Russia, and the United States) and ten non-permanent members elected by the UNGA. To move the issue to the UNGA under the Uniting for Peace resolution, we would need a majority of nine votes in the UNSC, which is two-thirds of its members. If China were to veto the resolution, we would have the option to transfer the issue to the UNGA. However, if we had initially presented the Senate resolution, we may have failed to secure the necessary two-thirds majority in the UNSC, rendering our resolution futile.
If we were to successfully obtain the nine votes in the UNSC, we could invoke the Uniting for Peace resolution and present the case to the UNGA. Winning in the UNGA, however, raises the crucial question of “What do we do next?” This blank spot in our plan is what prompted the French ambassador to inquire about our expectations. Carpio’s response, suggesting that condemnation is enough, lacks clarity and indicates a lack of direction. The main issue is determining our desired outcome. Traditionally, a victory in the UNGA under the Uniting for Peace resolution is viewed as a moral victory. Under the UN Charter, only the UNSC has the authority to authorize the use of force, as seen in the Korean War and the First Gulf War. However, in the first Afghan war caused by the Soviet invasion in 1979, the oil-rich Muslim countries formed a “coalition of the willing.” They decided to provide financial support to the Mujahideen rebels. This led to an escalation of the conflict, with the addition of “freedom fighters” like Osama bin Laden. Ultimately, this made the Afghan war unwinnable for the Soviets, and they withdrew their forces in 1989 during the Mikhail Gorbachev era.
Therefore, after winning a vote in the UNGA, we should consider forming a “coalition of the willing” to assist us in implementing the decision. This crucial aspect seems to have been overlooked in current discussions. Rather than relying on individuals like Bin Laden, we need maritime assets to assert our claims in the WPS. A coalition of like-minded countries can provide the necessary assistance, escorting our supply vessels to Ayungin Shoal and protecting our fishermen.
The WPS dispute is currently in its diplomatic phase, and it would be prudent to allow the Department of Foreign Affairs career diplomats to handle the situation moving forward.
Hermenegildo C. Cruz is a career ambassador who served in the UN from 1984-1986 and was a member of the Asean Committee that successfully worked for the withdrawal of Vietnamese forces from Kampuchea (Cambodia) under the Uniting for Peace resolution. His experience makes him the only ambassador with such a background. After his tenure in the UN, he was transferred to Moscow.
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