In 1969, NASA sent the astronauts of Apollo 11 to the moon amidst fears for their safety during the mission. However, even more concerning was the possibility that lunar microbes could survive the return trip and cause a devastating outbreak of lunar fever on Earth. To manage this possibility, NASA had planned to quarantine everything related to the mission that had been in contact with lunar material. However, new research by an environmental historian at Georgetown University has shown that these efforts were inadequate.
According to the study published in the science history journal Isis, NASA oversold their ability to neutralize the threat of lunar germs, which could pose a low-probability existential risk. Despite the National Academy of Sciences acknowledging the real risk of moon-Earth contamination and the futility of quarantine, NASA publicly maintained that it could protect the planet.
Moreover, the lunar receiving laboratory spent tens of millions of dollars on containment facilities, which failed fundamental tests. Inadequate and largely hidden from public knowledge, inspections and tests revealed problems with gloves and sterilizing autoclaves that cracked, leaked, or flooded. In less than a month after the Apollo 11 crew returned, 24 workers had been exposed to the lunar material the facility’s infrastructure was supposed to protect them from, necessitating quarantine.
This environmental historian’s research has shed light on the tendency in scientific projects to downplay existential risks while focusing on smaller, likelier issues. This fly in the face of the 1965 memo that suggested NASA was morally obligated to prevent potential contamination at all costs.
Despite lunar organisms’ small likelihood of reproducing in Earth’s oceans, the Apollo program accepted the potential threats on behalf of the planet. Such tendencies to downplay existential risks and prioritize likelier risks with lower consequences show up in climate change, nuclear weapons, and artificial intelligence as well.
NASA has learned crucial lessons from Apollo, says Nick Benardini, the agency’s current planetary protection officer. It is building in protections from the start, understanding scientific gaps, and working on a Mars sample laboratory. Communicating risks to the public is crucial because, as Dr. Benardini notes, “what’s at stake is Earth’s biosphere.” Mitigating low-likelihood and high-consequence risks is a crucial government task, according to Dr. Degroot.
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