Since its initiation last year, Russia’s war in Ukraine has posed a crucial question for Moscow: can President Vladimir V. Putin maintain his grip on power while engaging in a lengthy and costly conflict without a clear resolution in sight? The recent events involving Yevgeny V. Prigozhin, the leader of the notorious private army called Wagner, staging a short-lived rebellion against Russia’s military leadership do not completely answer that question, but they do indicate that the elite coalition that upholds Putin’s rule is under strain, with unforeseen consequences looming.
While authoritarian leaders may seem to govern with absolute authority, they rely on coalitions of influential elites to sustain their positions of power, according to analysts. The specifics of these coalitions vary depending on the country and circumstances. Some leaders rely on the military, while others depend on a single ruling party, religious authorities, or wealthy business leaders.
In Syria, for example, the military is predominantly comprised of members of Bashar al-Assad’s Alawite religious minority. These officers have long been reliant on the government for housing and other benefits, tying their fates to the survival of the regime. Even during the 2011 popular uprising that evolved into a protracted civil war, Assad’s loyalists within the military ensured his continued rule. The benefits of loyalty outweighed the potential costs.
Until recently, Putin’s alliance appeared robust, centered around the “siloviki” – a group of officials who entered politics after serving in intelligence or security services. These individuals now occupy prominent positions in Russia’s intelligence agencies, oil and gas industry, and government ministries. Putin’s enduring high levels of public support have also been a major source of his strength. Additionally, structural advantages have protected him, as he does not answer to a political party capable of replacing him, a contrast to the Soviet Union. Moreover, dividing power between various agencies, ministers, and wealthy businessmen ensures that no individual or entity possesses enough strength to orchestrate his overthrow.
However, when Russia initiated its invasion of Ukraine last year, experts warned that the conflict had the potential to undermine Putin’s hold on power. Erica de Bruin, a political scientist at Hamilton College and author of a recent book on coups, explained that the relationship between authoritarian rulers and their loyal elites can experience strain when dictators wage wars that the elites perceive as misguided.
For a while, Prigozhin seemed to be a solution to many of Putin’s troubles. The Wagner group joined the fighting in eastern Ukraine last summer when Russia’s military sought to recover from significant losses. Wagner’s offensive provided an additional tool for Putin to protect his power, countering the influence of the regular armed forces. The growing power of this mercenary force gave Prigozhin significant political momentum, which some analysts speculated could lead him to challenge Putin directly.
However, Wagner soon became problematic. Prigozhin began publicly criticizing the conduct of the war, particularly targeting Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu, a close ally of Putin. Through profane social media posts, Prigozhin accused Shoigu and the military’s chief of the general staff of cowardice, corruption, and recklessly endangering Russian lives. He stated that the ministry’s leaders should go barefoot to the frontline with machine guns.
As Prigozhin’s online following grew, so did his populist appeal, granting him a level of political celebrity that was virtually unheard of in Putin’s Russia. Some analysts even wondered if he would challenge Putin’s authority directly. Consequently, Shoigu moved to rein in Wagner by cutting off their access to prisons and eventually issuing an order for all Wagner fighters to sign contracts with the military by July. This move was intended to dismantle Wagner’s autonomy. Prigozhin refused to comply with the order but maintained his loyalty to Putin.
With Wagner facing threats from the military, the situation escalated rapidly. In a series of social media posts on Friday, Prigozhin accused Shoigu of ordering deadly strikes on Wagner fighters, declaring that the “evil” perpetuated by the military’s leadership had to be stopped. That evening, Prigozhin and his forces took control of Rostov-on-Don, and the next morning, they began marching towards Moscow.
It is important to distinguish that the uprising was a mutiny, not a coup. Prigozhin’s objective was to remove the senior military leadership instead of seizing power himself. On Monday, he described the action as a “protest” against the order to sign contracts. The mutiny came to an abrupt end when late on Saturday night, the Kremlin announced that Prigozhin would leave Russia for Belarus, and his troops would not face any consequences.
Now, the question lies in how this mutiny affects the elites who enable Putin’s hold on power and whether their incentives have shifted. Dr. de Bruin explains that mutinies can indicate dissatisfaction within the ranks that future coup plotters may exploit. A study observing military mutinies in Africa suggests that they rarely transition directly into coups, but they often increase the likelihood of coups in the near future.
On the other hand, failed coup attempts are frequently followed by efforts from leaders to purge suspected disloyal individuals, thereby strengthening their grip on power. For instance, after a failed coup in 2016, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan of Turkey cracked down on tens of thousands of individuals, purging the military and other institutions such as the police, schools, and courts.
However, in this particular case, purging may not be feasible. Since Prigozhin withdrew rather than being defeated by the Russian Army, Dr. de Bruin argues that “Putin doesn’t come out of this looking like he won the confrontation.” The public witnessed Wagner troops making their way towards Moscow and seemingly facing minimal consequences now. Although there may be more occurring behind the scenes, appearances matter. After making a brief statement on Saturday, Putin remained out of sight throughout the dramatic uprising and its aftermath. His government subsequently reached a deal with Prigozhin, despite Putin publicly condemning his actions as “traitorous.” Analysts claim that Putin’s response signifies that disloyalty may not be as costly as initially perceived.
Tatiana Stanovaya, a senior fellow at the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center, asserts that Prigozhin is an “exceptional phenomenon” and an outlier among Russia’s elites. However, she noted in her weekend analysis that he still dealt a blow to Putin. While the possibility of future imitators cannot be discounted, there will never be another figure quite like Prigozhin.
Nonetheless, this does not imply that Putin’s presidency is nearing its end. However, his hold on power appears more uncertain than ever before. Naunihal Singh, a professor at the Naval War College and author of a book on the strategic logic of military coups, argues that “Putin is now marked as weak enough to challenge.” He suggests that other challengers may emerge as a result.
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