The untimely demise of Yevgeny Prigozhin, the leader of the infamous Wagner mercenary group, has sparked intense speculation about the future of this dangerous private army. However, the truth is that Prigozhin’s death may not bring about significant changes. Another Wagner lieutenant can easily step in and fill the leadership void left by the tragic plane crash that claimed Prigozhin’s life.
Following Prigozhin’s failed mutiny in June, President Vladimir Putin compelled many Wagner mercenaries to surrender their weapons to the Russian military, fulfilling the wishes of his generals. Nevertheless, the most skilled fighters of the Wagner group are currently operating in Africa. Recent reports suggest that the Russian government is now moving to take control of the enterprise Prigozhin established in Africa, as it is simply too profitable for Putin to fully disband.
In fact, the business model Prigozhin created with the Wagner force has been incredibly successful, serving as a blueprint for aspiring mercenary leaders. This success may embolden upcoming paramilitary forces to enter unstable regions, exert their power in ruthless ways, and seize valuable resources. Over the past decade, mercenary groups around the world have become more prominent and daring, driven by the end of military contracts in Iraq and Afghanistan, an expanded labor pool, and diminishing restrictions on the use of private forces. Mercenaries are believed to have played significant roles in the assassination of Haiti’s President Jovenel Moïse, engaged in open battles with American troops in Syria, and sparked a lucrative mercenary market in Libya.
As someone who worked as a military contractor in North and Sub-Saharan Africa between 2003 and 2013, I witnessed firsthand the flourishing and illicit market for armed might. This ecosystem consisted of private spies, fixers, hired guns, and troll farms. I saw how this interconnected network could swiftly mobilize to meet demand. For instance, Nigeria reportedly employed mercenaries from Southern Africa and ex-Soviet republics in 2015 to combat Boko Haram. Additionally, during the failed mercenary coup d’état in Equatorial Guinea in 2004, I witnessed how a model similar to Prigozhin’s could destabilize vulnerable regions.
Prigozhin’s model has been profitable since 2014. He focused on conflict-ridden areas rich in natural resources, political rivalries, and post-colonial grievances, but lacking a strong rule of law. The blueprint likely involved pitching the idea to Putin, who would unofficially approve Wagner’s operations and provide military equipment and intelligence. Prigozhin would then approach potential clients, often heads of state or groups seeking to overthrow governments, and offer to safeguard their regime with Wagner’s muscle while creating an elite military unit to serve them. Additionally, he utilized his troll factory, the Internet Research Agency, to manipulate public opinion and exploit anti-West sentiment. In return, Prigozhin likely demanded two things: support for Russia’s interests and granting Russia access to valuable natural resources such as oil, natural gas, and gold. Notably, this system made Prigozhin immensely wealthy, generating around $250 million from natural resource extraction since 2018, and provided Putin with plausible deniability as Russia extended its influence and funded the war in Ukraine.
The success of Prigozhin’s model, alongside the atrocities committed by Wagner, raises concerns in an era when rare earth minerals and metals are crucial for manufacturing consumer electronics, renewable energy products, and national defense technologies. Many of the world’s largest untapped reserves lie beneath conflict-ridden landscapes in Central Africa and South Asia. Traditional mining companies face significant challenges operating in these areas, but mercenaries encounter fewer obstacles as they can seize control, defend against militants, governments, and competitors, and provide security for smuggling out valuable minerals. If emerging conflict entrepreneurs manage to establish control over rare earth minerals in the Congo region or exploit Afghanistan’s potentially massive lithium deposits, they could gain a strategic chokehold over the global supply chain. This would grant them the power to influence markets, blackmail nations, and shape geopolitics, echoing the historical influence wielded by the quasi-mercenary British East India Company.
If other private security companies can scale up, they too may enter the resource business. Already, several companies, including Russian, French, and Nigerian outfits, are operating or have the capacity to operate across Africa. Erik Prince, the founder of Blackwater, once proposed handing over Afghanistan’s security to mercenaries and funding it through mineral extraction. Although these companies may not strictly be mercenary groups, the increasing demand for rare earth minerals and the growing risks associated with mining them will likely attract conflict entrepreneurs to step in and take charge.
This was Prigozhin’s apparent model. While Putin may replace the general contractor, the Wagner forces are unlikely to be removed entirely. The fact that Putin continues to tolerate, use, and possibly assume more control over mercenaries, despite their humiliating and destabilizing march on Moscow, is a testament to Prigozhin’s lasting legacy. More concerning, however, are the copycats who may adopt similar approaches. A world saturated with mercenaries breeds more warfare and human suffering.
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