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The author of this article is a contributing editor for the FT, as well as the chair of the Centre for Liberal Strategies in Sofia and fellow at IWM Vienna.
On February 21, 2022, the day before Russia’s full-scale war on Ukraine, President Vladimir Putin held a televised meeting with Russia’s national security council. During this meeting, he asked council members to voice their opinions on whether Moscow should recognize the independence of the Donbas separatist republics.
This carefully orchestrated event portrayed Putin as a solitary, unpredictable leader who dismisses his senior advisers. They fear him and try desperately to please him, only to be humiliated for his own amusement.
However, the recent response from the Kremlin to the mutiny of Yevgeny Prigozhin, the leader of the Wagner mercenary group, challenges this perception. It was not solely Putin, but a collective figure known as the “collective Putin” that ultimately influenced the outcome of the crisis. This entity includes individuals such as Alexander Lukashenko, the dictator of Belarus. Putin, personally enraged and humiliated by Wagner’s betrayal, publicly threatened harsh actions. Yet, the “collective Putin” determined that negotiating with the rebels and finding an exit strategy would be a wiser approach. We now know that Putin met with Prigozhin and other Wagner commanders on June 29, which was a bitter pill for someone obsessed with treason and betrayal to swallow.
So, what has changed? The main shift lies in the relationship between Putin and the Russian elites. He now fears them as much as they fear him, particularly fearing their potential exit rather than their vocal opposition. Many of his closest collaborators hold him personally responsible for the current state of affairs. It was Putin’s decision to exploit the competition between Wagner and the defense ministry that ultimately led to Wagner’s march towards Moscow.
Prigozhin’s mutiny has exposed the central contradiction in Putin’s personnel politics. To succeed in the war, Putin requires ambitious and ruthless leaders like Wagner’s boss. However, to maintain his power and ensure the unity of the elites, he must rely on less charismatic figures such as defense minister Sergei Shoigu and General Valery Gerasimov, chief of the general staff. The fear of the emergence of a popular general like Georgy Zhukov, who captured Nazi Berlin, known as the “Zhukov effect,” explains why Prigozhin had to be eliminated. The public might see such a figure as an alternative to Putin.
The success of colonial wars hinges on people forgetting about them. Putin’s war in Ukraine is no exception. By insisting that the fighting in Ukraine is merely a special military operation and not a real war, Putin attempted to reassure Russians that nothing has truly changed in their lives, despite everything indicating otherwise. The mutiny by Wagner’s mercenaries shattered this facade of normality, which is crucial for the Kremlin. Merely protecting living standards is no longer enough to persuade Russians that they have nothing to worry about.
All coup attempts begin with conspiracy, and failed coups give way to paranoia. Therefore, it is logical to expect significant changes in the Kremlin’s top leadership. However, these expectations may be misplaced. While purges within the lower levels of the security services are inevitable, it remains uncertain whether the Kremlin will risk making changes at higher levels.
In the first year of the war in Ukraine, there were minimal changes at the top of the pecking order in Moscow. Although wars typically bring ambitious and often ruthless leaders to power, individuals who have proven themselves in battle, only two groups have risen in Putin’s hierarchy since February 2022. These groups consist of the sons of Putin’s old friends and his adjutants, individuals believed to be loyal and personally known to the leader.
Stability has taken precedence over the need for more effective leadership. However, following the Wagner mutiny, Putin faces a challenging decision. It is nearly impossible for him to dismiss Russia’s military leadership without tacitly acknowledging that Prigozhin was correct. However, it is equally challenging for him to win the war with this leadership in place. The Wagner insurrection has strengthened the influence of the “collective Putin.”
The perceptions of the mutiny inside and outside of Russia provide insight into its unintended consequences. While many Russians were terrified by the possibility of a civil war, leading to a collapse in Prigozhin’s approval ratings, the consensus in the West is that any change of power in Russia represents an opportunity. The belief is that any leader other than Putin, regardless of their political views, would be more inclined to end the war.
Regarding Prigozhin’s march on Moscow, it would be wishful thinking to view it as the precursor to the downfall of Putin’s regime. However, it would also be a mistake to overlook its significance. The march signals a shift in power from Putin the tsar to the collective Putin.
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